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Ideological Transmission in Extremist Contexts: Towards a
Framework of How Ideas Are Shared
Kim Knott and Benjamin J. Lee
Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion, Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats
(CREST), Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK
ABSTRACT
Despite their centrality in academic and policy debates about
radicalization and political violence, ideologies have been
conceived narrowly, as cognitive, top-down, coherent and
systematic. In general, those who have used the concept of
ideology have failed to draw on ideological theory or on recent
insights about its practice and embodiment, or location in space
and time. Our interest is less in the content of ideology than in
how it is shared by those for whom it matters. We offer an
interpretive framework, based on six key questions about
ideological transmission: What ideas, beliefs, and values are
shared, how and why, by whom, and in which spatial and
temporary contexts? Following a discussion about the
methodological pros and cons of the framework, it is tested on a
series of interviews with members of Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese
religious group responsible for the Tokyo subway attack in 1995.
We assess the strengths and limitations of the framework for
analysing the various dimensions of ideological transmission
before considering what it adds to our understanding of the
relationship between extreme beliefs and violent behaviour.
In research on extremism, political violence and terrorism, ideology have generally been
treated narrowly and uncritically, with little if any reference to the work of scholars
who have defined and studied the concept and its application. Ideologies have generally
been assumed to be coherent systems of ideas, and ‘ideology’ has been used as a
synonym for political or religious doctrine or knowledge, with little recognition of what
it means to people or how it is lived or shared. In some cases, ideology has been dismissed
as irrelevant to issues of extremist motivation and violent attacks, and as no more than as a
retrospective justification for action. Yet, despite such responses, ideology continues to be
seen as central to debates about radicalization and counter-extremism.
In this article, we summarize key arguments on the role of ideology in such debates, and
critique current working assumptions by engaging directly with the work of scholars who
have made ideology the focus of their theoretical and empirical research. We challenge
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narrow conceptions which focus solely on cognition or on ideologies as coherent world-
views, proceeding instead from the idea, articulated by Teun Van Dijk, that ‘ideologies
form the shared sociocognitive foundations of social groups and their social practices’.1
Specifically, we draw on Michael Freeden’s understanding of ideology as ‘thought-prac-
tices’, thereby foregrounding the social, material and embodied expression of ideas,
beliefs and values over and above their content.2 Given that a key concern of those
working on radicalization and political violence is the process by which people are
attracted and drawn into extreme beliefs and the social settings in which they are
shared, expressed and lived out, our principal focus is not ideology per se but its trans-
mission.3 We advance an interpretive framework for analysing how ideologies are com-
municated and applied by those with radical commitments or violent intentions.
Although we do not expect to resolve the problematic relationship between extreme
views and violent behaviour that is at the heart of debates about radicalization, we
suggest that our framework goes some way towards bridging the gap between belief and
action by connecting what is transmitted (the content of ideology) with how and why
it is shared and practised, by whom and in what contexts (the practice of ideology).
In order to test the framework, we apply it to interviews with members of Aum Shinrikyo,
the Japanese new religious movement that attacked the Tokyo subway with Sarin gas in
1995.
The place of ideology in research on extremism and political violence
Discussion about the concept and process of radicalization—the adoption of extreme ideas
and beliefs leading to violent behaviour—has to a significant degree rotated around the
part played by ideology. In the mid-1990s, Donatella Della Porta wrote that conversion
to violence ‘requires a specific redefinition of reality, which the individual arrives at by
adopting new beliefs and values. A value system therefore evolves within dense social net-
works and creates positive attitudes towards more radical forms of action’.4 Despite this
thoughtful early articulation of the relationship between beliefs and values (ideology),
social context and the move to violence, the issue became increasingly contested. In
‘The Trouble with Radicalization’, Peter Neumann noted that, in the debate about how
people become extremists, neither political ideas nor the methods by which they might
1Teun A. van Dijk, ‘Ideology and Discourse’, in Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent and Marc Stears (eds) The Oxford
Handbook of Political Ideologies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 175–196: p. 194. Although we do not
focus specifically on discourse nor do we adopt a critical discourse analytical approach, as will become clear later we
draw on van Dijk’s understanding that ideologies ‘are organized by schemas consisting of fundamental categories for
the existence and reproduction of social groups’ (p. 194). Our conception of ideology and its analysis is situated in
that family of approaches identified by Leader Maynard as ‘discursive’, those which focus on ‘the communicative practices
through which ideology is constituted, transmitted and made visible’ (Jonathan Leader Maynard, ‘A Map of the Field of
Ideological Analysis’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 18:3 (2013), pp. 299–327: p. 304).
2Michael Freeden, ‘Practising Ideology and Ideological Practices’, Political Studies, 48 (2000), pp. 302–322: p. 304.
3Ben Lee and Kim Knott, Ideological Transmission I: The Family, Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (2016),
https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/family-ideological-transmission/ (accessed July 19, 2019); Ben Lee and Kim Knott,
Ideological Transmission II: Peers, Education and Prisons, Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (2017),
https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/peers-education-prisons/ (accessed July 19, 2019); Ben Lee and Kim Knott, Ideologi-
cal Transmission III: Political and Religious Organisations, Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (2018).
https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/political-religious-organisations/ (accessed July 19, 2019).
4Donatella Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 136.
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be realized in violence could be ignored.5 But academic commentators and policy makers,
he said, had nevertheless favoured one or the other—extreme beliefs or violent action—
without bringing the two together in a serious assessment of ‘cognitive radicalization’:
both Randy Borum and John Horgan, for example, had suggested that terrorism and pol-
itical violence could be studied without reference to ideology.6 Although Neumann argued
for beliefs and political ideas to be seen as a key part of the explanatory mix, questions
about ideology and its role, and the relationship between extremist beliefs and violent
action have continued to be contested.7
Critics of ideology have variously stated that there has been too great a focus on extre-
mist beliefs at the expense of violent behaviour, on the assumption that such beliefs lead to
terrorism or direct support for it, or on the conflation of beliefs and behaviour.8 A well-
aired criticism about cognitive radicalization has been that it lacks explanatory power,
the argument being that, whilst thousands of people may share certain radical beliefs
and values, only a tiny minority go on to act violently on the basis of them.9
Despite these criticisms, most scholars concede that ‘ideology matters’.10 Its importance
for motivations and decision-making has been made by researchers from a range of dis-
ciplines, including social psychology, political science and the study of religions.11 Further-
more, as Liesbeth Van der Heide has stressed, ‘it’s not about whether we think ideology
matters, it matters because those that use violence in the name of ideology tell us it
matters to them’,12 a view endorsed by Dawson and Amarasingam: the transnational jiha-
dists they interviewed routinely stressed the importance of ‘ideology/religion and deeper
existential issues in their decision to become foreign fighters’.13
Acknowledging that ideology may not be a reliable predictor of extremist violence,
Guhl has nevertheless pressed the case for beliefs and ideas to be understood in interaction
with other motivating factors ‘such as social bonds, identity, emotions, moral outrage,
foreign policy, internal repression, need for belonging and status considerations’, a view
5Peter Neumann, ‘The Trouble with Radicalization’, International Affairs, 89:4 (2013), pp. 873–893: p. 875.
6Ibid., p. 879, though see later work by Horgan, e.g. Donald Holbrook and John Horgan, ‘Terrorism and Ideology: Cracking
the Nut’, Perspectives on Terrorism, 13:6 (2019), pp. 2–15.
7Ibid., p. 892.
8Charlotte Heath-Kelly, Christopher Baker-Baell and Lee Jarvis, ‘Introduction’, in Christopher Baker-Baell, Charlotte Heath-
Kelly and Lee Jarvis (eds) Counter-Radicalization: Critical Perspectives (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2015); Arun
Kundnani, ‘Radicalization: The Journey of a Concept’, in Baker-Baell, Heath-Kelly and Jarvis (eds) Counter Radicalization
(2015); Anthony Richards, ‘From Terrorism to “Radicalization” to “Extremism”: Counterterrorism Imperative or Loss of
Focus?’, International Affairs, 91:2 (2015), pp. 371–380.
9Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, ‘Understanding Political Radicalizaton: The Two Pyramids Model’, American Psy-
chologist, 72:3 (2017), pp. 205–216; Bart Schuurman and Max Taylor, ‘Reconsidering Radicalization: Fanaticism and the
Link Between Ideas and Violence’, Perspectives on Terrorism, 12:1 (2018), pp. 3–12.
10Mark Sedgwick, ‘Jihadist Ideology, Counter-Ideology and the ABC Model’, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 5:3 (2012), pp. 359–
372: p. 359; Liesbeth van der Heide, ‘Ideology Matters: Why We Cannot Afford to Ignore the Role of Ideology in Dealing
With Terrorism’, Penal Reform International, April 3, 2018, https://www.penalreform.org/blog/ideology-matters-why-we-
cannot-afford-to-ignore/ (accessed July 19, 2019).
11For example, John T. Jost and David M. Amodio, ‘Political Ideology as Motivated Social Cognition: Behavioral and Neu-
roscientific Evidence’,Motivation and Emotion, 36:1 (2012), pp. 55–64; Alessandro Orsini, ‘Poverty, Ideology and Terrorism:
The STAM Bond’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 35:10 (2012), pp. 665–692; Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín and Elisabeth Jean
Wood, ‘Ideology in Civil War: Instrumental Adoption and Beyond’, Journal of Peace Research, 51:2 (2014), pp. 213–226;
Sedgwick, ‘Jihadist Ideology’; Lorne L. Dawson and Amarnath Amarasingam, ‘Talking to Foreign Fighters: Insights into the
Motivations for Hijrah to Syria and Iraq’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 40:3 (2017), pp. 191–210.
12Van der Heide, ‘Ideology Matters’.
13Dawson and Amarasingam, ‘Talking to Foreign Fighters’, p. 193. See also Michael Kenney, ‘A Community of True Believers:
Learning as Process among “The Emigrants”’, Terrorism and Political Violence, (2017) pp. 1–20: p. 11. doi:10.1080/
09546553.2017.1346506.
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shared by other scholars.14 McCauley and Moskalenko, for example, incorporated beliefs
and feelings (‘opinion’) into their ‘two pyramids model’, whilst Hafez and Mullins
included political and religious ideologies—together with personal and collective grie-
vances, networks and interpersonal ties, and enabling environments and support struc-
tures—in a ‘radicalization puzzle’ aimed at explaining how individuals move to violent
extremism.15 Schuurman and Taylor, despite their initial criticisms, nevertheless saw
ideology as providing three conditions for fanaticism in an alternative model for assessing
who turns to violence and why: the presence of millenarian beliefs, the extent of ideological
control, and the militancy of beliefs.16 And, in a further model of individual radicalization,
Kruglanski et al. connected a person’s goal motivation (their ‘quest for personal signifi-
cance’) and social network with their ideology, ‘that is, a belief system identifying the
means to that goal’.17
These researchers saw ideology as one of an assemblage of factors in a dynamic radi-
calization process, some seeing it as complementary, others as facilitating the construction
of extremist identity or the move to violence. However, whether favourable or not to the
role of ideology, most of these scholars have limited it to the realm of cognition and belief,
a perspective with which we now take issue.
What do we mean by ideology and ideological transmission?
Those well versed in ideological theory have complained that the treatment of ideology in
studies of political violence and terrorism has been descriptive rather than analytical,18 too
narrowly defined to be useful,19 or just plain side-lined in favour of other factors and
issues.20 They have sought in various ways to raise the profile and deepen the discussion
of ideology. Sanín and Wood, for example, whilst acknowledging that ideology may have
an instrumental purpose for some armed groups, have argued for the need to consider
normative commitments and their potential impact on recruitment, motivation, identifi-
cation of a cause, and operational issues.21 Others too have discussed the centrality of
sacred beliefs and values in extremists’ willingness to move to violence.22
14Jakob Guhl, ‘Why Beliefs Always Matter, But Rarely Help Us Predict Jihadist Violence: The Role of Cognitive Extremism as a
Precursor for Violent Extremism’, Journal for Deradicalization, 14 (2018), pp. 192–217: p. 217. See also Holbrook and
Horgan, ‘Terrorism and Ideology’.
15Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, ‘Toward a Profile of Lone Wolf Terrorists: What Moves an Individual from Radical
Opinion to Radical Action?’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 26 (2014), pp. 69–85; Mohammed Hafez and Creighton
Mullins, ‘The Radicalization Puzzle: A Theoretical Synthesis of Empirical Approaches to Homegrown Extremism’,
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 38:11 (2015), pp. 958–975.
16Schuurman and Taylor, ‘Reconsidering Radicalization’.
17Arie W. Kruglanski, Michele J. Gelfand, Jocelyn J. Bélanger, Anna Sheveland, Malkanthi Hetiarachchi, Rohan Gunaratna,
‘The Psychology of Radicalization and Deradicalization: How Significance Quest Impacts Violent Extremism’, Advances
in Political Psychology, 35, suppl. 1 (2014), pp. 69–93: p. 80 (authors’ italics).
18David A. Snow and Scott C. Byrd, ‘Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements’, Mobilization: An Inter-
national Quarterly Review, 12:1 (2007), pp. 119–136: p. 121.
19Jonathan Leader Maynard, ‘Rethinking the Role of Ideology in Mass Atrocities’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 26:5
(2014), pp. 821–841: p. 824; Orsini, ‘Poverty, Ideology and Terrorism’.
20Sanín and Wood, ‘Ideology in Civil War’, p. 213.
21Ibid.
22For example, R. Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation (Lanham, MD: Rowman
& Littlefield Publishers, 2000); Scott Atran and Robert Axelrod, ‘Reframing Sacred Values’, Negotiation Journal, 24:3 (2008),
pp. 221–246; Jeremy Ginges and Scott Atran, ‘What Motivates Participation in Violent Political Action: Selective Incentives
or Parochial Altruism?’, Values, Fairness and Empathy Across Social Barriers, 1167 (2009), pp. 115–123; Matthew D. Francis,
‘Why the “Sacred” is a Better Resource than “Religion” for Understanding Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 28:5
(2016), pp. 912–927.
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A further criticism has been that those researching conflict and violence have failed to
take heed of advances in the field of ideological studies:
[A]ll is not well with efforts to theorise the role ideology plays in mass atrocities. Core con-
cepts have typically been defined vaguely, if at all, and it is not clear that leading theorists
actually share a common understanding of what ideology means, let alone how it relates
to other closely implicated phenomena.23
Criticizing the adoption of a narrow view of ideology as no more than ‘a handful of core
principles or beliefs’, Jonathan Leader Maynard argued for a broader conception of ideol-
ogies as ‘elaborate and bourgeoning cultural edifices—historically sculpted networks of
values, meanings, narratives, assumptions, concepts, expectations, exemplars, past experi-
ences, images, stereotypes, and beliefs about matters of fact’.24 He then identified several
‘causal pathways’ for ideology in the move to violence:
Ideology may (a) generate or shape active motives that create the desire to commit violence;
(b) create legitimating perceptions or beliefs which make violence seem permissible prior to/
during commission; and/or (c) provide rationalising resources for retrospectively dealing
with the commission or permission of violence after the fact.25
Others too have criticized weak accounts of the nature and role of ideology and offered
new avenues for its conceptualization.26 Going further than those in terrorism studies
who have incorporated ideology within a suite of contributory factors, Holbrook and
Horgan have stressed that is only by understanding ‘the emergence of social collective
and socially constructed sources of meaning that we begin to appreciate the more multi-
faceted role that ideologies can play in processes leading toward terrorism’.27 Others have
challenged the tendency among researchers to set up ideologies as coherent systems only
then to question their relevance when perpetrators turn out to have a shallow grasp of the
fundamentals. In response, van der Heide has called for a move away from seeing ideol-
ogies as coherent worldviews towards understanding ‘what the narrative means to individ-
uals and how it enables them to take action’.28 Manni Crone too has requested that
researchers give up thinking that ideology is something acquired in ‘highbrow discussions’
and turn instead to how it is embodied and enacted.29
This focus on ideology as socially meaningful practice is central to our understanding of
ideological transmission and its importance for studying extremist contexts and the move
to violence. It has its roots in the work of two theorists of ideology, Michael Freeden and
Roger Griffin. Challenging those who depicted ideologies as coherent, rational and deduc-
tive worldviews, Freeden made the case for them to be understood as ‘political thought-
practices’ concerned with controlling and changing how things are done.30 Ideology
should be understood as ‘a communal activity taking place in social space and recurring
23Leader Maynard, ‘Rethinking the Role’, p. 821.
24Ibid., p. 824; see also Roger Griffin, ‘Ideology and Culture’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 11:1 (2006), pp. 77–99: p. 81;
Snow and Byrd, ‘Ideology, Framing Processes’, pp. 123.
25Leader Maynard, ‘Rethinking the Role’, p. 828.
26Sanín and Wood, ‘Ideology in Civil War’; Snow and Byrd, ‘Ideology, Framing Processes’; Orsini, ‘Poverty’.
27Holbrook and Horgan, ‘Terrorism and Ideology’, pp. 7–8.
28Van der Heide, ‘Ideology Matters’.
29Manni Crone, ‘Radicalization Revisited: Violence, Politics and the Skills of the Body’, International Affairs, 92:3 (2016),
pp. 587–604: p. 602.
30Freeden, ‘Practising Ideology’, p. 304.
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over time’.31 For Griffin, as well as providing purpose and identity, ideology played a
primary role in ‘social conditioning, acculturation, and the perpetuation of the past
through tradition, and in the generation and implementation of revolutionary, future-
oriented projects for the creation of radically new situations’.32 For both authors, the
meaning-making aspect of ideology could and should not be separated from its purpose
and practice, location and temporal orientation, nor from its perpetuation and
transmission.
From an anthropological perspective, Crone added her voice to the call for a broaden-
ing of the understanding of ideology, suggesting that a narrow cognitive approach should
be replaced by an analysis of what ideology does, how it is shared and how it is ‘entwined
with violence’.33 Writing about the body and radicalization, she argued that ‘a violent
habitus is acquired through practice and imitation […] themodus operandi of the aspiring
jihadi is transmitted directly through enactment’.34 This practical and embodied ideologi-
cal learning is referred to by sociologists Mellor and Shilling as ‘body pedagogics’: ‘the
central institutional means through which a religious culture seeks to transmit its main
embodied techniques, dispositions and beliefs, the experience typically associated with
acquiring these attributes, and the embodied outcomes resulting from this process’.35
Ideologies are practically enacted, but also produced and transmitted within social con-
texts, such as families, peer groups, and political and religious movements and networks.36
Elsewhere we discuss the transmission of ideas, beliefs, and values through socialization,
education and learning, but here we call on theories of social learning to explore a process
of transmission which is participatory, practical and dynamic, but which remains subject
to issues of power, hierarchy and status.37 Many earlier studies of political and religious
communication focused on what Jennings, Stoker and Bowers referred to as the ‘standard
transmission model’,
[which] views parent–child similarity as an outcome of social influence and learning pro-
cesses operating within the home. These processes are assumed to rest on observational
learning and its variants of modelling, imitation, and identification, all of which work to
heighten reproductive fidelity along political lines.38
Whilst we share the interest of researchers of inter-generational transmission in how
ideas, beliefs, and values are transmitted and the social nature of the learning
31Ibid.
32Griffin, ‘Ideology and Culture’, p. 81.
33Crone, ‘Radicalization Revisited’, p. 602.
34Ibid., p. 601.
35Philip A. Mellor and Chris Shilling, ‘Body Pedagogics and the Religious Habitus: A New Direction for the Sociological Study
of Religion’, Religion, 40:1 (2010), pp. 27–38: p. 30 (authors’ italics).
36Snow and Byrd, ‘Ideology, Framing Processes’; Lee and Knott, Ideological Transmission I, II, III.
37Lee and Knott, Ideological Transmission I, pp. 12–24; Lee and Knott, Ideological Transmission II, pp. 25–40; Lee and Knott,
Ideological Transmission III, pp. 29–44; Arthur Bandura, Social Learning Theory (New York: General Learning Press, 1971);
Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger, Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991); John Coopey, ‘The Learning Organization, Power, Politics and Ideology’, Management Learning, 2:2 (1995),
pp. 193–213. Some earlier studies of terrorism drew on Bandura’s social learning theory to explain how newcomers to
political violence learnt through imitation and participation, with behaviours acquired as a consequence of the ‘cognitive
reconstrual of moral imperatives’ (Martha Crenshaw, ‘How Terrorists Think: What Psychology Can Contribute to Under-
standing Terrorism’, in L. Howard (ed) Terrorism: Roots, Impact, Responses (New York: Praeger, 1992), pp. 71–80; Jeff
Victoroff, ‘The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches’, Journal of Conflict Resolution,
49:1 (2005), pp. 3–42).
38M. Kent Jennings, Laura Stoker and Jake Bowers, ‘Politics across Generations: Family Transmission Re-examined’, The
Journal of Politics 71:3 (2009), pp. 782–799: p. 783.
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process, our principal focus is the transfer of ideological material in extremist groups
and broader milieu. In such settings, transmission may be intra-generational and bi-
directional as well as inter-generational; it is as likely to take place across social and
geographical boundaries as within them, and online as well as offline.39 Our concern
is not ideological fidelity nor the effectiveness of the transmission process; indeed,
we recognize that those involved may be more or less knowledgeable about particular
ideas or values, and more or less likely to identify with or remain attached to them.
Nevertheless, it is clear that they engage to a greater or lesser extent with ideological
material, embodying and practising as well as cognitively learning the worldviews
they seek to emulate and adopt.40 They do so in the context of those ‘communities
of practice’ they admire or to which they make a commitment, whether organized
groups or informal networks.41
When first theorized, a model of apprenticeship was used to explain the transmission of
skills that enabled newcomers to become active participants in such a community.42
However, some of those who have employed the notion of ‘communities of practice’ in
research on extremism and political violence have questioned whether this model is
sufficient for such contexts. Karsten Hundeide, for example, asked whether a ‘community
of practice’ approach could be applied to movements ‘where commitment and conversion
to a new life is more essential than the acquisition of some craft or skill’.43 He ident-
ified the stages of ‘becoming a committed insider’, from contact with charismatic
leaders and the adoption of identifying marks and symbols, to redefinition of the
past and adoption of new values, demonization of the enemy, and the demonstration
of commitment through action.44 Commitment to an extremist cause entailed making
expressive and emotional changes, and responding to increasing ideological demands,
loyalties and sacrifices.45 Michael Kenney, in his study of al-Muhajiroun as a commu-
nity of practice, noted how it bound practitioners together, instilling teachings through
study groups and participation in protest and activism.46 Newcomers, Kenney said,
absorbed the worldview and practice of the group from touring speakers, through com-
panionship and self-reflection, by shadowing more experienced mentors, and by pro-
ceeding through the ranks, from novice to instructor.47 Although elements of cultural
39Michael McDevitt and Steven Chaffee, ‘From Top-Down to Trickle-Up Influence: Revisiting Assumptions About the Family
in Political Socialization’, Political Communication, 19:3 (2002), pp. 281–301; Anders Westholm and Richard G. Niemi, ‘Pol-
itical Institutions and Political Socialization: A Cross-National Study’, Comparative Politics, 25:1 (1992), pp. 25–41; Samuel
C. Woolley, Philip N. Howard, ‘Automation, Algorithms, and Politics| Political Communication, Computational Propaganda,
and Autonomous Agents—Introduction’, International Journal of Communication, 10:9 (2016), pp. 4882–4890.
40Snow and Byrd, ‘Ideology, Framing Processes’; Hafez and Mullins, ‘Radicalization Puzzle’; Crone, ‘Radicalization Revisited’.
41Lave and Wenger, Situated Learning; John Seely Brown and Paul Duguid, ‘Organizational Learning and Communities-of-
Practice: Toward a Unified View of Working, Learning, and Innovation’, Organization Science, 2:1 (1999), pp. 40–57.
42Lave and Wenger, Situated Learning.
43Karsten Hundeide, ‘Becoming a Committed Insider’, Culture & Psychology, 9:2 (2003), pp. 107–127: p. 108 (author’s italics).
See also John G. Horgan, Max Taylor, Mia Bloom and Charlie Winter, ‘From Cubs to Lions: A Six Stage Model of Child
Socialization into the Islamic State’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 40:7 (2017), pp. 645–664.
44Ibid., pp. 113–114.
45Ibid., p. 121.
46Kenney, ‘A Community of True Believers’, p. 14, pp. 5–11; see also Quintan Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extre-
mism in the West (LanhamMD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005). Al-Muhajiroun was first formed in the 1980s in Saudi Arabia
by Omar Bakri Muhammad and later established in the UK in 1996 following Omar Bakri’s resignation from Hizb-ut-Tahrir.
It adopted an extreme jihadist position and was at the violent end of the Salafi spectrum. The group voluntarily dis-
banded in 2004 to pre-empt an expected UK Government ban, and was eventually proscribed, under several different
names, in 2010.
47Ibid.
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apprenticeship—such as imitating and learning the skills of more established partici-
pants—could be seen in both these cases, other elements of ideological transmission
were also at work, such as the relationship of a charismatic leader and his/her fol-
lowers, persuasive communication, peer bonding and learning, embodied knowledge,
and what might be called ideological fine-tuning, in which newcomers, through per-
sonal reflection and emotional work, aligned and identified themselves with particular
beliefs and values.48 Ideological transfer was multi-directional, with newcomers and
more established practitioners learning from and influencing one another, and with
everyone an active agent in the transmission process. Both explicit, abstract knowledge
and tacit, experiential knowledge were passed on, no doubt for different reasons and in
different circumstances.49
The work of Kenney and Hundeide notwithstanding, much research on extremist and
terrorist transmission has focused on operational rather than ideological processes.50
They are difficult to separate, however, as operational training and decision-making
do not occur in an ideological vacuum, but are shaped by ideas, beliefs, and values.51
Some scholars have explicitly made the connection between the two, with Crone, for
example, arguing that ‘religio-political ideas conveyed in extremist milieus can incite
specific forms of action, point out specific targets and contribute to the justification of
violent behaviour’.52 Normative commitments too have been seen to influence
decision-making, acting as constraints not only on motivations, but on the strategies
and tactics of armed groups.53 Ideologies may limit behaviour as well as permit or
condone it, and may be used to channel people towards certain courses of action
rather than others.
In order to shed light on the role of ideology in extremism and political violence we
have favoured theoretical insights that best reflect a socio-cognitive conception of ideology
as thought-practice and an account of ideological transmission as social, material and
embodied, as well as cognitive. We are indebted to those theorists whose work we dis-
cussed earlier for the following definition of ideological transmission: the communication,
embodiment and practice of socially produced ideas, beliefs, and values for the purposes of
generating and expressing shared meanings, traditions and identities, binding communities
and legitimizing individual and collective action.54 In the next section, drawing on this
definition, we outline an interpretive framework for analysing ideological transmission
in extremist contexts.
48Ibid.; Hundeide, ‘Becoming a Committed Insider’; Lee and Knott, Ideological Transmission III, pp. 37–44, 47–48.
49Michael Kenney, ‘Beyond the Internet: Mētis, Techne, and the Limitations of Online Artifacts for Islamist Terrorists’, Terror-
ism and Political Violence, 22:2 (2010), pp. 177–197.
50For example, Paul Gill, John Horgan, Samuel T. Hunter, Lily D. Cushenbery, ‘Malevolent Creativity in Terrorist Organ-
izations’, Journal of Creative Behavior, 47:2 (2013), pp. 125–151; Brian A. Jackson, John C. Baker, Peter Chalk, Kim
Cragin, John V. Parachini, Horacio R. Trujillo, Aptitude for Destruction: Organizational Learning in Terrorist Groups
and its Implications for Combating Terrorism, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005); Louise Kettle and
Andrew Mumford, ‘Terrorist Learning: A New Analytical Framework’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40:7 (2017),
pp. 523–538.
51Lee and Knott, Ideological Transmission III, pp. 39–41.
52Crone ‘Radicalization Revisited’, p. 602.
53Sanín and Wood, ‘Ideology in Civil War’, p. 222.
54Van Dijk, ‘Ideology and Discourse’; Leader Maynard, ‘Rethinking the Role’; Freeden, ‘Practising Ideology’; Griffin, ‘Ideology
and Culture’; Crone, ‘Radicalization Revisited’; see also Stuart Hall’s definition of ideology in, Stuart Hall, ‘The Problem of
Ideology: Marxism without Guarantees’, In David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen (eds) Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cul-
tural Studies (London: Routledge, 1996 [1986]), pp. 25–46: p. 29.
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An interpretive framework for analysing ideological transmission
For all that scholars have agreed that ideology matters for understanding conflict and vio-
lence, there has been no agreement on how it should be researched and few studies that
have proposed methods or approaches for its analysis.55 Even where it has been accepted
as a legitimate element in a radicalization matrix, little attention has been given to its
precise role and how that role might be studied. In our view, focusing on ideological trans-
mission rather than ideology per se, and breaking it down into constituent dimensions,
helps the move away from a narrow focus on either cognition, key texts or ideologues. Fur-
thermore, it requires a consideration of why and how ideas, beliefs, and values are trans-
ferred, and the process of change in time and space.
What follows is an interpretive framework for analysing ideological transmission.
Rather than being the result or summation of empirical research, the framework has its
origins in a multidisciplinary review of the literature on the transmission of ideas,
beliefs, and values.56 Further, it builds on the ‘ideology schema’ identified by Teun van
Dijk and composed of the foundational categories of identity, activities, goals, norms
and values, group relations and resources.57 As such, it has relevance and application
beyond the study of extremism and political violence to other arenas of political and reli-
gious discourse and practice.
The framework (Table 1) separates the process of ideological transmission into six con-
stituent parts: purpose, substance, practice, and social, spatial and temporal dimensions.
This is achieved by asking a series of questions—in no particular order—about why and
how ideas, beliefs, and values are transmitted, acquired and practised, who is involved
in the process, where and when, and what it is that is being passed on. In order to
address the dimensions in more depth, we break down the questions still further into sub-
sidiary issues. The framework is intended as a methodological tool rather than a represen-
tation of the process of transmission itself. The questions should not be read as steps or
stages, but as aids to the analysis of ideology and its transmission in contexts of extremism
and political violence.
As the framework is theoretically rather than empirically derived, it does not have its
roots in a particular type of data or research method. It is instructive, therefore, to consider
the suitability of diverse data sources and the challenges they present for the application of
the framework, especially in the context of extremism and political violence where oppor-
tunities for ethnographic observation and interviews may be limited.
Potential primary sources include self-accounts in autobiographies, diaries, interviews,
and police and court documents, and ideological material produced by individual authors
or groups, including books, ephemera, videos, podcasts, websites, objects, and symbols. As
is shown in Table 2 below, by their very nature, different data sources have distinctive
benefits, limitations and ethical implications, and may well be better suited to answering
some questions than others. For example, when using autobiographical and interview
55Notable exceptions have included Leader Maynard, ‘Rethinking the Role’; Kruglanski et al., ‘The Psychology of Radicaliza-
tion’; Holbrook and Horgan, ‘Ideology and Terrorism’; Donald Holbrook, ‘Designing and Applying an “Extremist Media
Index”’, Perspectives on Terrorism, 9:5 (2015), pp. 57–68. See also Kettle and Mumford, ‘Terrorist Learning’, on an approach
to operational learning.
56Lee and Knott, Ideological Transmission I, II, III.
57Teun A. van Dijk, Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach (London: Sage, 1998): p. 314; van Dijk, ‘Ideology and Discourse’,
p. 179.
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data, researchers have to be aware of the potential for authors and interviewees to be selec-
tive or biased in their recollections and explanations, given that their self-accounts are pro-
duced with the benefit of hindsight and through a subjective lens.
Secondary sources may also be useful, though the data they contain is twice-mediated,
by the original researcher and then by the scholar or journalist who draws on their
work. The most useful secondary materials are likely to be in-depth case studies which
pull together material from multiple sources to describe, represent and frame the
culture, history, relationships and/or practices of a group, network or social location.
Observational material acquired covertly, for example by undercover journalists, may
be informative, but may also be ethically suspect, raising questions about its reliability
and framing.
Table 1. Ideological transmission: an interpretive framework.
Question Dimension Issues to consider
Why? Reasons and motivations for
ideological transmission
Purposive Individual formation; life-long learning; recruitment; group cohesion;
intergenerational transmission? Theological and/or political
authorisation? Informing outsiders (propaganda)? Rationale for
action?
What is transmitted? Substantive An ideology, theology or worldview? Political, religious, both? A set
of teachings and/or practices? What type of material is transmitted
(sermons, ethos, curriculum, sacred text, propaganda, symbols,
artefacts, music)? What is its ideological content?
How is it transmitted? Techniques
and practices
Practical Nature of process: in/formal; explicit/tacit; auto/didactic? Mode of
delivery (e.g. textual, visual, face-to-face, online)? Medium (e.g.
publication, video/podcast, workshop, masterclass, forum etc)?
Pedagogical approach and method? Bodily practice?
Who is involved in the transmission
process?
Social Transmitters? Receivers? Roles and relationships (e.g. teacher/pupil;
charismatic leader/follower; parent/child; peer-to-peer; role
model/apprentice)? Social issues (e.g. hierarchy, power, agency,
autonomy, critique, discipline)?
Where does transmission take
place?
Spatial Geographical location? Context and venue (e.g. home, school/
college, political party or network, religious institution, place of
worship)? Open/closed spaces? Online/offline? Significant/
symbolic locations?
When does it take place? Temporal Developmental/life stage? Regularity/frequency/duration?
Significant, symbolic and/or ritual times?
Table 2. Primary data sources for an analysis of ideological transmission in extremist contexts:
dimensions and limitations.
Primary sources Key dimensions Analytical considerations
Autobiography Why, how, who,
where, when?
Hindsight; potential ideological bias (e.g. ex-member
effects, nostalgia, audience targeting)
Video/audio interviews Why, who, when? Hindsight; ideological bias; celebrity effects
Interview Why, how, who,
when?
Hindsight; potential interviewer bias; interviewee
selectivity
Police/court documents Who, where, when? Hindsight; interviewer bias; interviewee selectivity
Books, tracts, sermons, manifestos,
lectures, fiction
Why, what? Relationship of ideas/beliefs to practice?
Representative of wider group?
Ephemera (statements, posters,
images, magazines etc)
All (depends on type
of source)
Selective; partial; designed for specific purpose;
representative?
Video/audio talks, sermons, short
films etc
Why, what, who? Didactic? Propagandist? Representative?
Websites; online forums All (complexity of
source)
Analytically challenging; liable to change or removal of
content/site
Material culture and symbols
(e.g. buildings, dress, flags, art)
Where, what, when? Analytically challenging; cultural trend or ideological
statement?
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In the next section, we examine ideological transmission in more depth by applying the
framework and its dimensions to a particular case, a small data set of interviews with
members of Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese religious group whose extreme beliefs and prac-
tices led some members to resort to violence and terrorism.58 This involves a recursive
process in which the researcher moves back and forth between the data and the framework
before producing an analytical narrative and drawing conclusions.59 In this test of the fra-
mework we use the dimensions to deconstruct the transmission process, before assessing
the analytical utility and limitations of the framework. It is important to state that this is an
interpretive framework, which necessarily displays some of the strengths and weaknesses
associated with qualitative approaches involving thematic analysis (e.g. flexibility
v. reliability).60 However, the reliance in the framework on dimensions that are familiar
and easy to apply suggests it to be an approach that is open to replication. The likelihood
is less that researchers will disagree about applying the dimensions to the data than that
the conclusions they draw—their interpretations—will differ. This leaves open the possi-
bility of collaborative discussion, cross-checking, even disagreement, which some would
argue is a weakness and others a strength.
Applying and testing the framework: the case of Aum Shinrikyo
In the case of the Japanese new religion, Aum Shinrikyo (Aum), there are multiple sources
of data with the potential to contribute to an analysis of ideological transmission. Many
were produced within five years of the group’s terrorist attack on the Tokyo subway in
1995, although media accounts continued to appear, with the latest written to coincide
with the executions in July 2018 of those convicted of preparing or carrying out this
and other acts of violence.61
Self-accounts and interviews from before the attack were limited to a small number of
testimonies by early members published in Aum’s in-house magazine, and in media inter-
views with the founder. For data relevant to the motivations of those involved and events
leading up to the attack, scholars are reliant on material gathered and released retrospec-
tively. Such accounts are necessarily limited by what individuals chose to remember and
how they reported it (see Table 2 above). The majority of autobiographical accounts take
the form of statements, letters, and interviews in Japanese, with some in English trans-
lation.62 Court documents, too, have contained statements by individuals made during
trial proceedings.63 Perhaps the most informative self-accounts have been interviews
recorded since the attack with ex-members and those remaining within the two
58These interviews were conducted by the Japanese author, Haruki Murakami, in 1998 and published as ‘The Place that was
Promised’, Underground: The Tokyo Gas Attack and the Japanese Psyche (London: Vintage, 2013 [1998]), pp. 211–309.
59Virginia Brown and Victoria Clarke, ‘Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology’, Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3:2 (2006),
pp. 77–101: pp. 86–87.
60Brown and Clarke, ‘Using Thematic Analysis’: pp. 96–97; Lorelli S. Nowell, Jill M. Norris, Deborah E. White and Nancy
J. Moules, ‘Thematic Analysis: Striving to Meet the Trustworthiness Criteria’, International Journal of Qualitative
Methods, 16 (2017), pp. 1–13.
61For example, Reiji Yoshida and Sakura Murakami, ‘Aum Shinrikyo Guru Shoko Asahara and Six Other Cult Members
Hanged for Mass Murders’, The Japan Times, July 6, 2018.
62For example, Kanariya no Kai hen, Oumu wo Yameta Watashitachi (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2000); Kyodo, ‘Letters Written
by Executed Aum Cult Members Reflect Regret, Desire to Live’, The Japan Times, July 7, 2018.
63See the thirteen-volume collection of trial documents assembled by the Japanese newspaper, Asahi Shimbun.
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organizations formed after Aum was disbanded, Aleph and Hikari no Wa, including those
published by the Japanese novelist, Haruki Murakami, to which we will turn shortly.64
Books by the founder, Shoko Asahara (born Matsumoto Chizuo, 2 March 1955), con-
stitute Aum’s ideological canon (in Japanese, with several translated into English).65 They
were the principal means by which potential recruits came into contact with the move-
ment and its eclectic teachings (primarily Buddhist, but including elements of Hindu
and Christian thought and practice) in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The transmission
of Aum’s ideology was by no means restricted to Asahara’s published works, however.
He preached and conversed regularly with members, especially in the early days when
the group was small, and made various media appearances. Later recruits might also
have encountered Aum’s foray into manga books, or its broadcasts on Radio Aum Shin-
rikyo.66 Photographic images of Asahara looking serene and charismatic in the lotus pos-
ition, preaching, and being worshipped by his devotees were widely circulated at this time.
Aum was keen not only to recruit newcomers but to manage its public image, something
that became difficult in a media environment that became increasingly critical and hostile.
In terms of secondary source materials, in addition to academic studies, of particular
note were two documentaries, entitled A and A2, made by the filmmaker Tatsuya Mori,
filmed inside Aum in the years following the attack.67 These sensitive, in-depth explora-
tions differ markedly from the many short news items, court reports and comment pieces
in the Japanese and wider global media. In general, the grey literature on Aum drew
heavily on academic and journalistic sources, with a key exception being the security
report written by Richard Danzig and others on how Aum members came to develop bio-
logical and chemical weapons. Despite its focus on technical and operational rather than
ideological transmission, with the benefit of first-hand material from imprisoned Aum
members, it showed the importance of the founder’s guru status and teachings, and of
members’ commitment and devotion in the move to weapons development and
violence.68
In the case study that follows, we apply the framework to a single data set, the inter-
views conducted by Haruki Murakami in 1997–98, first published in Japanese in the maga-
zine Bungei Shunju, and in English translation in 2000.69 Despite being subject to the
limitations of autobiographical interviews (see Table 2 above), this source has a number
of practical and methodological advantages. It is accessible in English as well as Japanese,
64Those who have drawn on such interview data include Ian Reader, Religious Violence in Contemporary Japan (Richmond:
Curzon, 2000); Robert Jay Lifton, Destroying the World to Save It (New York: Owl Books, 2000); Richard Danzig, Marc
Sageman, Terrance Leighton, Lloyd Hough, Hidemi Yuki, Rui Kotani and Zachary M. Hosford, Aum Shinrikyo: Insights
Into How Terrorists Develop Biological and Chemical Weapons (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security,
2012). Murakami, ‘The Place that was Promised’.
65Including Shoko Asahara, Secret Initiation (New York: Aum USA, 1988); Shoko Asahara, Mahayana Sutras (Tokyo: Aum
Shuppan, 1988); Shoko Asahara, Beyond Life and Death (New York: Aum USA, 1993). For a full list and analysis, see
Susumu Shimazono, ‘In the Wake of Aum: The Formation and Transformation of a Universe of Belief’, Japanese
Journal of Religious Studies 22: 3–4, (1995): pp. 383–384.
66Japan Subculture Research Centre, ‘A Short History of Aum Shinrikyo, Their Murders, and the Failure to Stop them’, http://
www.japansubculture.com/a-short-history-of-aum-shinrikyo-their-murders-and-the-failure-to-stop-them/ (accessed July
19, 2019).
67A, DVD, directed by Tatsuya Mori (1998; ‘A’ Production Committee. Tidepoint Pictures); A2, DVD, directed by Tatsuya Mori
(2001; ‘A’ Production Committee. Tidepoint Pictures).
68Danzig et al., Aum Shinrikyo, pp. 37–38.
69Murakami, ‘The Place that was Promised’.
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having been translated by Murakami himself (who also conducted the interviews). As he
noted, his aim was sensitive objectivity:
I did not undertake these interviews with present and former members of the cult in order to
criticize them or denounce them, nor in the hope that people would view them in a more
positive light. What I am trying to provide here is […] flesh-and-blood material from
which to construct multiple viewpoints.70
In interviews of three to four hours, Murakami recorded the testimonies of eight ‘present
and former members’, two women and six men, all of whom had been middle-ranking
‘renunciates’ (shukkesha; those who had renounced society).71 From different social and
educational backgrounds, they had all made a conscious decision to leave their families,
jobs and wider society to live, work and undergo religious training in the movement.
They had attained different levels of responsibility and spiritual progress. According to
their own testimonies, they had not carried out acts of violence nor had they any fore-
knowledge of the attacks.
In this analysis, we have three objectives: to apply and test the ideological trans-
mission framework (set out in Table 1) with a single data set, in this case from a reli-
gious group that turned to violence; to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the
framework and its application; and, in the Conclusion, to assess its utility for the
study of extremism and the move to violence. As it is neither our concern to discuss
the rise and fall of Aum more generally nor to offer a full account of the interviews,
we have provided little background information, and have been selective with
examples.72 In order to evidence our analysis, and to facilitate replication of the
study, references to the data are provided in footnotes. Although Murakami names
his interviewees, for brevity we have anonymized them in the text and abbreviated
their names in the footnotes.73 As we proceed to apply the framework, we step back
from the process, not only to interpret the data, but to comment on the amount
and type of material thrown up by the six dimensions.
The purposive dimension: what reasons did interviewees give for being attracted
to and transmitting Aum ideology?
As we suggested in Table 2, we would expect interviews to provide data on how individuals
and groups represent their motivations and purposes in seeking out and transmitting ideo-
logical material. Murakami’s interlocutors frequently commented on their reasons for
becoming attracted to Aum and the founder’s teachings. Refracted in hindsight through
the lens of Aum’s Buddhist philosophy, they looked back at the period prior to their invol-
vement as a time of dissatisfaction, alienation, suffering, and impermanence.74 They were
seeking a better way, an alternative, a remedy or a convincing explanation. Most saw Aum
70Ibid., p. 215 (author’s italics).
71Ibid.
72For more information on Aum and the attack, see Reader, Religious Violence.
73Murakami, ‘The Place that was Promised’: page references to interview transcripts as follows: Hiroyuki Kano (HK), pp. 217–
228; Akio Namimura (AN), pp. 229–238; Mitsuharu Inaba (MI), pp. 239–250; Hajime Masutani (HM), pp. 251–260; Miyuki
Kanda (MK), pp. 261–271; Shinichi Hosoi (SH), pp. 272–284; Harumi Iwakura (HI), pp. 285–294; Hidetoshi Takahashi (HT),
pp. 295–304.
74These are key Buddhist concepts. See Reader, Religious Violence, and Shimazono, ‘In the Wake of Aum’.
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as answering a question or need: it offered the ‘purer kind of doctrine’ one seeker was
looking for; another found the dissatisfaction of his earlier quest for ‘a “remedy” to
life’s problems’ answered at an Aum study centre where ‘they explained my situation to
me and told me right then and there how to treat it’.75 In the retrospective narration of
their personal struggles, and the fit and timeliness of Aum’s solution, interviewees drew
not only on Buddhist ideas, but on the Christian concepts of apocalypse and Armaged-
don.76 As one interviewee said, this was one of the axes around which Aum Shinrikyo
revolved: ‘Armageddon’s coming, so become a renunciate.’77
Most interviewees’ answers to the Why? question focused on their personal quest for
spiritual formation; they said little about wanting to transmit this to others. However,
they did discuss Aum’s diagnosis of the suffering and fate of the world and Asahara’s com-
pulsion to communicate this more widely, often interlacing their comments with refer-
ences to Aum’s books and magazines, and to its ascetic practices. As such, they brought
together subjective goals with collective theological and strategic ones. Aum’s ideological
purpose was bound up both with what it taught and how this was transmitted and learned
by disciples.
The substantive dimension: what ideas, beliefs, and values were transmitted
within Aum and by its members?
We would expect this dimension to generate the kind of data most commonly associated
with the study of ideology in extremist contexts: those political and/or theological ideas
and beliefs espoused by a movement’s ideologues and close followers. As well as being
found within expository books, magazines, and other sources, we might expect to find
such material referred to in interviews, both with reference to the sources themselves
(in this case, Asahara’s published work, audio-visual lectures etc), and to the movement’s
key principles and practices. This was indeed the case. However, the first point to make is
that those who joined Aum in the late-1980s and early-1990s were not blank slates in ideo-
logical terms. Most had experimented previously with other spiritual paths, had read phi-
losophical and religious books (e.g. by Swedenborg, Nietzsche, Gurdjieff and Kafka), and
tried other religions (e.g. Christian groups, esoteric Buddhism, Zen, Soka Gakkai).78 The
apocalyptic prophecies of Nostradamus—widely circulated in Japan in the 1980s, and
translated by Asahara—were mentioned by most interviewees, with one affirming his
‘great influence on my generation’; this interviewee was ‘planning my life’s schedule
around his prophecies’.79 The focus on Armageddon as necessary for salvation became
a common ideological reference point within Aum.80
Intertwined with Asahara’s teachings on the apocalypse, his early writing on yoga, and
meditations for renouncing the world and eliminating false views also attracted followers.
Later works cited by interviewees focused more on renunciation and training as a process
for achieving liberation.81 As recruits, they found Aum’s magazines and leaflets instructive
75Murakami, ‘The Place that was Promised’, p. 231 (AN), pp. 218/222 (HK).
76Shimazono, ‘In the Wake of Aum’.
77Murakami, ‘The Place that was Promised’, p. 297 (HT).
78Ibid. All interviewees.
79Ibid., p. 238 (AN).
80Ibid, p. 238 (AN), p. 288 (HI); p. 300 (HT).
81Ibid., p. 263 (MK).
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and inspiring; they were impressed by members’ spiritual testimonies: ‘they practised what
they preached’.82 Introductory talks at Aum centres and TV and video footage were inter-
viewees’ first exposure to spoken testimonies and their practical embodiment and rep-
resentation in dress and symbols.83
Examining the ideological material transmitted by Aum through the retrospective lens
of the interview brought to light those ideas and beliefs that—as new members—they had
found appealing and persuasive, and identified the media through which they were chan-
nelled. Interviewees also made reference to the changing nature of what was taught: the
benefits of yoga in the early days, with an apocalyptic turn from about 1990.84 The intro-
duction of the path of Tantra Vajrayana (an esoteric Buddhist path) was noted, including
the concept of poa, in which violence was justified as an aid to personal liberation and the
salvation of others.85 One interviewee stated, however, that ‘only those people who have
reached an extremely high stage practise Vajrayana’, and another that he ‘couldn’t
easily swallow the doctrine of Vajrayana’.86 In contrast, other interviewees were keen to
stress Aum’s statements on nonviolence, which they interpreted to mean they should
avoid hitting children or killing insects.87 Although the interviewees—all middle-
ranking members—claimed not to have known about the secret development of biological
and chemical weapons, they were all exposed to repeated calls for Aum to defend itself
against possible external attack, as well as to the frightening effects of chemical leaks
which were never justified or explained.88
These comments by interviewees not only alert us to the importance of looking at
changes over time in ideological content (perhaps best examined in a longitudinal study
rather than one-off interviews), but at the processes of ideological selection and
framing, at what was or was not transmitted, to whom, and how it was shaped and pre-
sented to members.
The practical dimension: how was ideology practised, and what ideological
transmission techniques did Aum use?
Central to the task of reorienting ideology away from cognition and content towards
behaviour and practice—following Freeden’s conception of ideology as ‘thought-prac-
tices’—is a focus on how ideas, beliefs, and values are enacted, embodied and lived.89
We would expect interviews to provide some relevant data, though perhaps less than
for the purposive, social and temporal dimensions, and for it to be selective and retrospec-
tive. Further, although interviewees might comment directly on ‘what they did’, they might
not tie their actions directly to their beliefs or worldview, leaving the researcher to make
such interpretive connections.
The interviews showed that, whilst Aum’s ideology pervaded all aspects of life, its
approach to passing on its teachings was not formalized. No official doctrine, catechism
82Ibid., p. 298 (HT), see also AN, SH.
83Ibid., AN, SH, MI.
84Ibid., p. 288 (HI).
85See Reader, Religious Violence; Shimazono, ‘In the Wake of Aum’.
86Murakami, ‘The Place that was Promised’, p. 227, (HK); p. 299 (HT).
87Ibid., p. 250 (MI), p. 269 (MK); see also Mori, A.
88Ibid., HT, SH, MK.
89Freeden, ‘Practising Ideology’; Crone, ‘Radicalization Revisited’.
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or curriculum was drawn up. What was evident, however, was that teachings were not just
mental constructs for those in Aum, but ideas to live by, whether these were ideas about
yogic practice, renouncing family and possessions, disciplining the body or carrying out
acts of violence on the self or others. How such ideas were practised and embodied was
discussed frequently by interviewees. This ranged from comments about mundane
tasks, to those on spiritual practice, asceticism, and violence.
Although none of those interviewed were formally involved in teaching the philosophy
and practices to others within or beyond Aum, they became part of the transmission cycle
in other ways, e.g. by preparing and distributing leaflets, drawing cartoons and animations
for Aum propaganda, and teaching science to the movement’s children.90 They also
undertook practical roles which contributed to the sustainability of Aum, such as
cooking, cleaning, clerical work, building, welding, and management duties. Several inter-
viewees did make the link between this work and Aum’s ideas: such duties were under-
stood to build up ‘spiritual merit’, or to provide a teaching opportunity.91 Others
recognized that carrying out mundane tasks assigned by the guru was ‘an act of
devotion’.92
In addition to practical service, most alluded to those spiritual activities prescribed
openly in Asahara’s books, such as meditation, breathing exercises, and various kinds of
initiation. Some also referred to practices taught only to renunciates, such as ‘secret
yoga’ and ascetic acts, including those of a violent nature. One interviewee, for
example, observing his own failure to advance despite devotion to the guru and a
period of intensive training, study and meditation, noted that from 1993 ‘sermons increas-
ingly focused on Tantra Vajrayana [and] our training started to include some bizarre
elements’.93 In his account of this ascetic regime, he described martial arts, being hung
upside down with legs tied in chains, lie detection tests, solitary confinement, drug exper-
imentation, and a practice called ‘Christ initiation’.94 Although this interviewee began to
question and challenge these practices, and eventually escaped, more generally members
subordinated their will, faith and better judgement to ‘an order from the top’, as a mark of
being chosen and a sign of their devotion, self-discipline, and spiritual advancement.95
Whether doing physical labour or spiritual training, renunciates accepted the dictum
that they must transform their bodies before changing the world.96 Rather than focus
on book learning or formal didactics, through body work they ‘embodied [the] techniques,
dispositions and beliefs’ expounded by Asahara in the expectation that they would reap the
prescribed outcomes of purification and liberation.97 This link between thought and
embodied practice was made clear when one interviewee expressed the view that, ‘Apoc-
alypse is not some set idea, but more of a process. After an apocalyptic vision, there’s
always a purging or purifying process that takes place.’98 Dramatically enacted in the
90Ibid., MK, HI, SH, HM, MI.
91Ibid., p. 243 (MI); p. 266 (MK).
92Ibid., p. 254 (HM).
93Ibid., pp. 254–255 (HM).
94Ibid., pp. 255–257 (HM).
95Ibid., p. 258 (HM); p. 301 (HT).
96Ibid., p. 298 (HT).
97Mellor and Shilling, ‘Body Pedagogics’, p. 30.
98Murakami, ‘The Place that was Promised’, p. 303 (HT).
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Tokyo subway attack, such a vision was also practised on the bodies of those who com-
mitted to Aum’s violent worldview.99
The social dimension: who was involved? What were their roles and
relationships?
Examining the social dimension opens up the internal and external roles and relationships
associated with ideological transmission (who transmits to whom) and the operation of
hierarchy, power, and agency within the process. In an autobiographical interview, we
might expect the interviewee to position themselves at the centre of their own narrative,
and to comment on their relationships with significant others, whether family, peers or
—in this case—Aum leaders and disciples. Our interest was in the web of ideological
relations they wove and any routes, hubs and breaks in the transmission process.
Testimonies showed Asahara—as guru, teacher and ideologue—to be pivotal to Aum
and the transmission of its ideas, beliefs, and practices. He was repeatedly alluded to as
the charismatic personality who attracted them to the movement and sustained their
involvement thereafter.100 As early recruits, some had benefitted from his personal atten-
tion, advice and guidance in ‘secret yoga’; they spoke of his power, aura, charisma and
kindness.101 One stressed the need for a spiritual guide ‘who would provide the final
answer to Buddhist teachings. The one who would interpret it for me’.102 Asahara
evoked devotion and obedience, convincing some of his divine power and gifts.103
Others—perhaps with hindsight—were more cynical.104 Although Asahara was undoubt-
edly the figurehead, others in Aum’s upper echelons were also held in high esteem.105
Murai Hideo, Yoshihiro Inoue and Fumihiro Joyu were referred to as speakers,
decision-makers and managers capable of motivating, disciplining and exercising power
over others. They played key roles in the transmission of Aum’s ideology, embodying
its ideas and values and enforcing its training requirements. However, even these elite
members did as they were told, according to one interviewee.106
There is little reference in these testimonies to peer relationships, at least until after the
attacks when leaders had fled or been arrested, and remaining members had been left to
their own devices. Before this, the clear message was that, despite working alongside one
another, they were on personal spiritual journeys and were largely unconcerned with the
progress or problems of others. There was no sense of transmission or learning between
peers, except to reinforce the need for obedience, faith, and devotion.107 Several tried to
question the orders they received, but were met with expressions of anger, disappointment
or no response at all. They were expected to accept and endure the situation for reasons of
spiritual gain. After the subway attack, however, socially ostracized and with few oppor-
tunities to return to society, they came to rely on one another, sharing their doubts and
99Ibid.
100Hundeide, ‘Becoming a Committed Insider’. David C. Hofmann and Lorne L. Dawson, ‘The Neglected Role of Charismatic
Authority in the Study of Terrorist Groups and Radicalization’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 37:4 (2014), pp. 348–368.
101Ibid. MK, MI, HM.
102Ibid., p. 244 (MI).
103Ibid., p. 253 (HM); p. 275 (SH).
104Ibid., pp. 252–253 (HM); p. 290 (HI).
105Ibid., p. 282 (SH); p. 301 (HT); p. 241 (MI).
106Ibid., p. 282 (SH).
107Ibid., HT, MH.
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confusion, and benefitting from mutual support: ‘What gets me through each day is my
ex-Aum friends’, said one.108
Most interviewees expressed an unwillingness to accept that fellow members might
have been involved in the attacks. The distance between them and those outside the move-
ment had never felt greater, with one saying ‘there’s such a huge gap between the Aum I
experienced and the picture of Aum outsiders have’.109 In fact, the testimonies revealed
almost nothing about the external relationships of members after their initial withdrawal
from family, friends and wider society, and initiation as renunciates. Most made no
attempt to keep in contact or recruit others. Furthermore, for some, this distancing
process could not be reversed: ‘When I entered Aum I burned every photo album I
owned. I burned my diaries. I broke up with my girlfriend. I threw everything away.’110
Although a few attempted to return to their families after the attack, most had no basis
on which to rebuild, and no beliefs or values in common to allow connections to be made.
The spatial and temporal dimensions: where and when did transmission take
place? How were space and time significant?
In addition to analysing the purposive, substantive, practical and social aspects of ideologi-
cal transmission, space and time offer important lenses for several reasons.111 In ideologi-
cal testimonies they constitute important symbolic markers in the representation of this
and other worlds. Actual places and times may be considered sacred, may be commemo-
rated and memorialized. In addition, mythic and imagined futures may operate as a source
of desire and motivation. Individuals often stress personal timelines or sites of importance
in their narratives of ideological engagement; groups—via leaders, recruiters, teachers and
the doctrinal material and propaganda they disseminate—portray eschatological, utopian
and sometimes apocalyptic times and spaces as they flesh out their ideological pathways.
As we suggested earlier, autobiographical or oral history interviews might be expected
to offer rich material on why, how and by whom ideology is transmitted (Table 2). The
temporal dimension (when) might also be important. However, we might expect less
detail than in some other data sources about ideological content (what) and its spatial
transmission (where). These suppositions were broadly borne out. Relatively little infor-
mation was provided in the interviews about where things happened, with some references
to Aum centres, such as Setagaya in Tokyo and the Mt Fuji headquarters, to sites where
individuals worked, and to a secret chemical production facility (Satyam No. 7). Intervie-
wees referenced these in order to situate events and activities within their narratives rather
than to as describe them in and of themselves. In fact, places—whether actual or imagined
—were only rendered in detail on the rare occasion that they were connected to powerful
experiences. For example, in his account of enforced ascetic practice, one interviewee
described the locked solitary confinement cell, ‘the size of one tatami mat’, the heat and
grime, and the absence of toilet or washing facilities.112 Another described Satyam No.
108Ibid., p. 248 (MI); p. 284 (SH); see also Mori, A.
109Ibid., p. 269 (MK).
110Ibid., p. 303 (HT).
111As Freeden noted, ideologies are communal activities which take place in space and time. Freeden, ‘Practising Ideology’,
p. 304.
112Ibid., pp. 256–257 (HM).
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7 as ‘a dangerous place’ where he was exposed to a chemical leak, and where he was later
called on to disguise the building’s interior in case of a raid by the authorities.113
Interviewees revealed substantially more about when things happened, though they
were rarely specific about years and dates. Although they may move backwards or for-
wards in time, autobiographical interviews of this kind tend to frame events chronologi-
cally. They rely on the interviewee’s subjective time-line: in the case of Aum, from early life
to first point of contact, initial experiences, subsequent work and training, what the subject
was doing when the subway attack was carried out, and what happened thereafter. This
temporal structure formed the backdrop against which interviewees mapped out their
involvement and, latterly, distanced themselves from violence and those responsible for it.
Interviewees’ understandings of the passage of time and their own place within it was
ideologically-inflected. In one telling case, an interviewee revealed how an ideological shift
led to his decision to cooperate with the police: ‘Aum threatened me, saying that if I talked
I’d be cast into eternal damnation, but I no longer believed that.’114 The account of his time
in custody was replete with temporal details: ‘They held me for 23 days’, with the interrog-
ation taking place ‘three times a day and each session was really long’; it continued ‘day
after day’.115 Intense and traumatic experiences of this kind tended to generate recollec-
tions rich in both spatial and temporal detail.
Added to this, in association with Aum’s apocalyptic ideology, the interviewees often voiced
their conception of past events and the future with reference to the imminence of Armaged-
don.116 One interviewee thoughtfully discussed the place of apocalyptic thinking not only in
Aum’s eschatology but in the wider national consciousness, often drawing on temporal (and
spatial) tropes. Describing a general ‘sense of terror about the near future, the direction our
world’s heading in’, he was explicit about the centrality of the End times for Aum followers:
‘Aum is a collection of people who have accepted the end.’117 Relating this to his personal
quest, along with other followers, he said he had imagined a utopian society and ‘discarded
the world’, though he was later required to re-engage with it following the subway attack.118
Focusing on the spatial and temporal dimensions of ideology and its transmission not
only highlights references made to actual places and times, but requires the researcher to
consider the way in which individuals engage with ideological material to support their sub-
jective vision and interpretation of this and other worlds and the timeline for moving
between them. In Aum, the developing sense that the world had turned against them and
that violence was needed to realize the End and bring about the movement’s ultimate
purpose was increasingly expressed within Asahara’s publications and statements.
The framework as a methodological resource for analysing ideological
transmission in Aum
The framework offered a series of dimensions through which to focus and elicit infor-
mation on ideology and its transmission. The analytical process was both recursive and
113Ibid., p. 280 (SH).
114Ibid., pp. 282–283 (SH).
115Ibid.
116See Footnotes 76 and 77.
117Ibid., p. 297 (HT).
118Ibid., p. 296; p. 303 (HT).
POLITICS, RELIGION & IDEOLOGY 19
interpretive: in this test case, it required us to return repeatedly to the interview data with
different questions in mind, and then to interpret the evidence found there to form an
overall picture of transmission in Aum Shinrikyo, of what ideas, beliefs, and values
members shared, how and why they did so, who was involved, and under what social,
spatial and temporal conditions.
There were several challenges. Decisions about what information to include or exclude
and how to code it were sometimes difficult, and to a degree subjective, although the
dimensions were sufficiently straightforward and distinctive to minimize coding problems.
More challenging was the nature of the research problem—ideological transmission
within extremist contexts—in so far as it raised issues about how ideology, and the
process and conditions in which it is shared and lived might or might not be understood
as ‘extreme/extremist’ (which, as a result, might impact on data selection and interpret-
ation). This will be discussed further in the conclusion, suffice it to say here that the frame-
work itself is neutral on the subject. It is a general framework which can be applied
irrespective of the nature of the ideological context.
Having said this, it should be stressed that the framework was developed with the inten-
tion of providing a counter-weight to approaches in which ideology had been treated
solely as cognitive. Analysing the practical, social and spatial dimensions of transmission,
in particular, has helped show how ideas, beliefs, and values are expressed and lived out
individually and collectively, are subject to hierarchy and power relations, and have sym-
bolic, spatial and emotional entailments. Our focus on the multi-dimensional nature of
ideology in order to analyse its adoption and transmission is not intended to deny the
possibility that some ideologies might cohere, nor to downplay the interconnections
between the various dimensions. Although individuals may not believe in or intellectually
subscribe to a coherent system of ideas or worldview, they may commit to it in order to
satisfy a need to belong or to express an identity. By practising that ideology—whatever
their motivations—they embody it, helping to give it credence and social force. For
those in Aum, their thoughts about society and the future, and willingness to submit to
tough ascetic and work regimes for personal spiritual progress mirrored the movement’s
teachings. Even as Aum’s ideas and practices became more extreme andmembers began to
have doubts, their belief in the guru and the efficacy of the training meant they remained
committed (even after the attack).
Conclusion: extremism, violence and the transmission of ideology
Our aims have been to develop an interpretive framework for analysing ideological trans-
mission and to test its application with data from an extremist context. They were set
within a critical review of the literature on the role of ideology in radicalization and pol-
itical violence. Drawing on the work of theorists of ideology and those who have examined
its practice and embodiment, we moved away from cognitivist assumptions about ideology
as a coherent worldview, and repositioned it as ‘thought-practices’, focusing less on the
content of ideology than on how it is shared, expressed and lived.119 The resulting frame-
work (Table 1) distinguished six dimensions—purposive, substantive, practical, social,
119Freeden, ‘Practising Ideology’, p. 304; Leader Maynard, ‘Rethinking the Role’; Griffin, ‘Ideology and Culture’; Crone, ‘Radi-
calization Revisited’.
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spatial and temporal—which were designed to dissect the process of ideological trans-
mission. In addition to testing the framework on a small data set of interviews, potential
methodological benefits and limitations were discussed.
What if anything did using the framework reveal for research on extremism? The fra-
mework need not be limited to the analysis of ideological transmission in extremist con-
texts, but it can certainly be applied to them, as shown in the test case of Aum Shinrikyo.
However, whilst the framework can help to generate relevant evidence about how, why,
where and when ideological material is transmitted and by whom, it is neutral on
whether or not such evidence can be labelled extremist. Which ideas, beliefs, values and
associated symbols and practices are designated ‘extreme’, and under what circumstances,
remains open to discussion.
In the case of Aum, many observers have viewed apocalyptic thinking, a fixation with
Armageddon, a belief in the guru as the object of devotion, and increasingly negative
views about the world and a desire to be liberated from it as ideologically extreme.120
However, these features are shared by a number of radical religious and political
groups, past and present. In Aum, as members practised what they preached, such
beliefs had behavioural ramifications, with members cutting themselves off from outsi-
ders and participating in disciplinary regimes tantamount to torture. Spiritual retreat,
self-discipline, and devotional practice are not uncommon features of religions, but
such exclusionary, intensive and violent practices are rare. It was in the practice of
their ideology rather than in their ideas alone that Aum members could really be said
to have courted the label ‘extreme’.
Re-envisioning ideology as thought-practices necessarily has implications for how it is
understood to relate to behaviour. Although it remains important to avoid conflating
beliefs and actions or assuming that one leads unproblematically to the other, the decision
to move the focus from the content of ideas and beliefs to how they are transmitted and
expressed is a step towards reconnecting the two. The perennial question about whether
people act violently on their extreme beliefs is defused; by sharing, practising and embody-
ing such beliefs, they have already begun the process of acting on them. Ideology is necess-
arily behavioural as well as cognitive.
Radicalization theorists have agreed that ‘the adoption of radical beliefs alone is not
a necessary or sufficient condition for involvement in terrorism’.121 They have con-
sidered ideology to be a poor predictor of violent behaviour on the basis that thousands
of people may share extreme beliefs (including those that endorse or advocate vio-
lence), but only a tiny minority go on to act violently. Whilst we do not dispute
these views—and certainly make no predictive claims for the framework—it is impor-
tant to challenge the narrow cognitive understanding of ideology on which they are
generally premised. To side-line the role of ideology in political violence and terrorism
on this basis, or indeed on the grounds that not everyone who shares violent views pro-
ceeds to act on them, would be to risk losing a powerful concept that helps explain how
and why people are drawn into extremism and what leads some to prepare or carry out
violent or terrorist acts.
120For example, Reader, Religious Violence; Lifton, Destroying the World; Danzig et al., Aum Shinrikyo.
121Schuurman and Taylor, ‘Reconsidering Radicalization’, p. 4; McCauley and Moskalenko, ‘Understanding Political Radica-
lization’; Guhl, ‘Why Beliefs Always Matter’; Holbrook and Horgan, ‘Ideology and Terrorism’.
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A single test case is insufficient for drawing reliable conclusions on the role of ideologi-
cal thought-practices in the move to violence. Nevertheless, the application of the frame-
work’s dimensions to interviews with members of Aum did generate relevant observations
on the relationship between beliefs and violent behaviour that can be tested in future
studies:
. the presence in Aum of beliefs about violence and nonviolence, and some evidence of
the ideological legitimization of violence
. the culture and practice of violence on the self and others, explained and justified with
reference to Aum’s beliefs and values
. a social context of authoritarianism, obedience, and devotion which enabled and
reinforced an arduous and at times violent disciplinary regime
. an ideological and physical environment of exclusion and secrecy with limited
opportunity for beliefs to be contested, for communication with the outside world or
escape
. and a conviction that the end was nigh and the group was under immediate threat from
outsiders that supported the decision to act violently.
Breaking ideological transmission down into its constituent dimensions helps reveal the
linkage between beliefs and behaviour, the processes and people involved, and the under-
lying conditions. As an analytical resource, the framework has potential for use in con-
junction with current theories on the role of ideology in radicalization and political
violence, for example, on causal pathways, significance quest, fanaticism, and the
violent habitus.122
For those who commit acts of terror and violence, ideology—in the broad sense we have
used it here—may indeed play a defining role in the construction of their identity and life-
style, and in their choices and motivations, commitments and sacrifices. It is difficult to
make sense of the move to violence without factoring in the beliefs and values actors
deem to be important, how these are lived and shared, embodied and practised, and the
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